Global Pathogen Surveillance: The Governance Gap Between Open Science and Biosecurity
Problem Definition
The world has no coherent framework for global pathogen surveillance that balances the need for rapid, transparent data sharing during epidemics with the legitimate need to prevent misuse of pathogen information. Countries operate fragmented, incompatible surveillance systems with no binding standards for what data must be shared, how quickly, and with whom.
The result is a choice between two bad equilibria: restrict access and risk delayed response to emerging threats, or enable open access and risk enabling bioweapons research. This governance gap has grown acute as sequencing costs have fallen — soon every country will have the capacity to sequence pathogens, but no agreement on how to handle the data.
Root Causes
No international treaty establishes binding surveillance standards or data-sharing requirements
Pathogen genomic databases (GISAID, GenBank) are voluntary repositories with no enforcement power
Biosecurity concerns — justified — lead many researchers and governments to restrict pathogen data sharing
Low-income countries lack surveillance infrastructure and incentives to participate in global surveillance networks
Surveillance data is treated as national security information, not global public health common pool resource